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Almost from its infancy tha Witwatarsrand mining industry grew
up undar tha shelter of substantial government encouragement and
support. Although spokesmen for tha mines have always attempted to
portray their impressive achievements as a triumph of free enterprise
capitalism, 1 the laadere of the industry themselves assiduously^cour-
tad state assistanca from the time of Kruger's republic onward.
Thera is a closa parallel with the greet transportation companies
which threw steel across western North America in the latter part of
the 19th century, engulfing vast tracts of the public domain and huga
government subsidies in the process. American and Canadian governments
were drawn to the support of tha railwaysfor some of the same reasons
which brought South African governments into partnership with the
mining houses. Railways in the one case end gold in the other were
perceived as the basic instruments of nation building. This was too
important a matter to leave purely to private enterprise. Further-
more, it quickly became apparent that private companies were either
unwilling, in tha case of such enterprises as the Cenedian Pacific
Railway, or unable, as with the South African gold mines to do the
Job unaided by government. The railway companies took their assistance
in tha form of direct cash subsidies and in lend. While the mining
industry did not raquire cash subsidies until the 1960's (when car-
tain low grade mines were subsidized), what it did require through-
out its history was an enormous legislative end administrative effort
to organize the black labour supply — a crucial element in mining
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costs.
Several considerations can be advanced to explain why the mines
required state support in this area. One set of factors had to do
with tha persistent unwillingness of Africans to accept mine labour,
especially underground, whera any altsrnatives were open to them.
Africans were perfectly well aware of conditions on the Randf of
which mines were to be prefersd to others, of uege levels and of the
availability or not of alternative employment. Even before the
South African war officials were actively involved in efforts to over-
come this resistance During the Crown Colony period, tha administration
mads still greater efforts in the same direction. Considerations of
mining economics alao led the companlas into A cloaa dependonco upon
government. Tha peculiar nature of the Uitwaterarand ore formations
(and the uncertainties which this produced in e highly coat sensitive
industry)was one factor. Another was conflict and rivalry between the
various mining houses. Unable through their own institutions f- control
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to plsca along tha reef, houaver, and thera were usually sharp fluc-
tuationo within individual minaa. Uncertainty was increased by tha
need at tha very actset to datarmina which of the ore bodies.in a
particular oir.a could ba profitably extracted and which uers of ao
low a arads as not to warrant development. This was the crucial de-
cision. Gncs tha nine UBS developed, its shafts sunk and its drives
located, the design might be prohibitively expensive to change. It
was much cheaper to sink a large shaft to begin with than to enlarge
a small one later on.
Since the pries of gold was fixed throughout this period, the
payability or not of a particular ore body depended upon, first, the
yield in gold per ton of ora and, secondly, upon the critical factor
) of working costs. TheaB factors determined the "pay limit".. Geo-
logical exploration could give the mine owner some indication of the
quality and extent of the ore in his mine. Working costs, nowevar,
wars determined by social and economic forces which often lay only
marginally undar his control, A conservative company uihich daveloped
only its richer and clearly payable ore, might find itaelf, assuming
a subsequent fall in working costs, with vast tonnages of now payable
but inaccessible ora. Conversely, a gambling mine management, developing
its low grade ore bodies on the basi3 of an optimistic view of tha
future, might find itself faced with substantial capital losses if
costs failed to fall. Richer mines wsre affected by thesa considerations
to a la333r degree than poorer ones, but most of the minino houses
*) had one or morB mines where cost problems ware critical.
The requirements of mining development — tha need to invest
and dayelop at tha outsat for the whole life of the mine — tended
to make gamblers of the Randlords. So alao did the very nature of the
mineral in question. There is lota of evidence of the peculiar fas-
cination exercised by gold upon generations of miners, speculators
and hoarders, and it SBems that tha flint-eyed captains of Rand
finance were far from immune* The same individuals who might cheerfully
have left ton3 of, say, uneconomic copper in a mine dedicated them-
selves on the Rand to the single-minded pursuit of the laat possible
pennyweight of gold. Thus uea the propensity to gamble intensified.
Like all shrBwd gamblera tha mine owners sought to hedge their bets
and so to protect themselves from the various uncertainties to which
they wars vulnerable. The group oyatem of control waa one device for
accomplishing this. It not only rationalized mining administration
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and parmitted savings in management coats (through provision of can—
tralizad managerial, secretarial and engineering services), but more
importantly it enabled the owners in affect to subsidize tha poorer
mines from tha profits of tha richer on93 during periods of adversity.
A more important device for stabilizing working costs was to
3aak favourable policies from the government. Through tha Chamber of
nines and through tha press which they controlled, tha mine ounara
stressed from the beginning that the welfare of the state uas de-
pendent upon the health of the gold industry* More subtle was their
affort to make the demands of the Industry as a whole coincide with
the needs of its weakest producers* The Rsndlords enjoyed considerable
tbsir
A succeaa in " efforts to promote tha notion that the uelfare of the
entire industry was to be measured by the profitability or not of the
12low grade mines. Whenever the profitability of of the lou grade
producers seamed to be threatened, mining spokesmen would trumpet that
the whole industry uas in crisis. At such moments — and they tended
to be frequent — the claim uas usually also made that the prosperity
and stability of Transvaal society uas at stake: galloping unemploy-
ment and social instability in tha whits community and falling govern-
ment revenues — this was the spectre which was held up as the in—
g
e
g
conaequenca of the failure to recue the lou grade mines. The
effect of such propaganda uas to identify the welfare of the industry
and of the society as a whole with tha maximization of output. Steady
expansion usually involved mining orea of lower grade, and this in
turn required lower coats*
The degrea of success which the Chamber of nines enjoyed in its
efforts to identify the survival of the low grade producers with the
welfare of the entire society ie revealed in tha reports of the ple-
thora of mining commissions and inquiries which from 1897 have been
established by successive governments. Invariably the special pro-
blems of the lou grade mines figured prominently in thesa investigations.
Not until 190? whan the 8otha government established thB Wining
Industry Commission was there an effort made to look critically at the
arguments advanced by the minaa to Justify favourable treatment. Earlier,
-both-tne—Induatr-ial—Commiaaion of Inquiry (1B97) and the Transvaal
Labour Commiaoion (1903) were dominated by the Chamber. The industry
uas enormously aided in that it had a naar monopoly of the information
naaded to assess the highly technical problems of Rand mining.
Commissions of Inquiry, therefore, had little choice but to rely upon
13
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Chamber data and sven Chamber expartise in conducting their inves-
tigations. Euan the nining Industry Commission of 1908, though it was
inclined to be very critical of group mining and financial practices,
was handicapped in making an effectivs case by its reliance upon in-
dustry data. In short tha state was alow in South Africa to develop
the capacity raquired to look critically at the mining industry. Of
course in this period, the occasions whan the governments were in—
14
cllnad to do ao tended to be rare.
These general considerations halp to explain why the Randlords
should hava committed themselves ao early and so thoroughly to high
cost, (relatively) low profit exploitation of the low grada ores.
Still there was nothing inevitable about it. In the medium term good
profits could have been made by concentrating upon the richer ores on
1 5
the basis of a not much reduced acale of operations. Moreover, the
low grade mines were risky ventures, highly vulnarable to small in-
creases in costs. The failures end difficulties of numbers of such
ara one reason (though not the most important) to explain tha
wastage of large capital sums and the rather lout return to the industry
upon gross capital investment, as calculated by Frenkal. In fact
other considerations than those notad above were involved in the aarly
commitment to lou grada mining. _ They have to do with tha optimism
about the future of Rand mining which prevailed in the mid-1890's and
with tha state of the capital markets for South African mining shoras.
The last six or seven years before tha South African Ider saw Bn
enormous expansion in the mining industry. The first of the deep level
mines were developed at this .time, and very, large capital investment
wee required. Expansion was the product of two main considerations.
The boom conditions in the share market in 1894-5 and to a lesser
degree in early 1899 offered an advantageous time to seek new capital.
Companies ware floated which never would have been launched in or-
17
dinary circumstances. Moreover, the financial houses on the Rand
were enabled, through their market operations, to take profits which
probably exceeded — at least for some of the groups — tha profits
1 8from actual mining. After 1895 the possibility of securing wind-
fall profits in this way largely disappeared. Henceforward profit de-
pended to a greater extant upon the performance of tha minBs them-
aBluBa, including the marginal propositions floated during the boom.
The other consideration which encouraged expansion was the confident
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baiief that working costs would coma down through reform in government
19policies and through technological innovation* Here were further in-
ducemanta to investment in the davalopmant of OTB bodies which could
not ba profitably worked under the than prevailing conditions. That
this typa of gambling investment was being made may ba illustrated
from tha experience of Rand Mina3 Limited, a well-managed and highly
profitable company controlled by tha industry leadar, Uernher, Bait/
Eckstein. In 1907, the Rand Ninas Chairman, 3. Reyersbach, noted that
the nines of his group had several million tons of lou grade ore de-
veloped (much of it in the pre-war period) and ready for extraction
whenever cost reductions made this possible. The speedy exploitation
of thasa deposits he regarded as a matter of priority. Rayerabach es-
timated ths average yield of this lou grade ora at 16s per ton, com-
pered with an average yield for operating mines of 40s par ton in 1897
20
and 34s 6d. in 1906, Here is avidence of an optimism verging upon
recklessness*
Tha collapaa of the boom in "kaffirs" in lata 1895 and subsa-
quant vicissitudes induced by political crisis and war brought cost
problems to the fore and exposed tha precarious position of the lou
grade producers. Both the Johannesburg Consolidate Investment Company
(Barnato) and the Robinson company were in serious difficulty even be*
fore the war. Testifying before the Industrial Commission of Inquiry
in 1897, 3CI consulting engineer, UJ.L. Hamilton, estimated that his
21group had two million pounds tied up in idle plant and equipment. E.
) Brochon of Robinsona noted in his evidence before the same inquiry
that, while tha reform demands of the industry would produce only an
eight per cant reduction in working costs, this was a matter of "life
22
and death11 for meny companies. Of all of the groups these two firms
wera most heavily committed to low grade mining* However, even the
dominant company, Ulernhar, Bait/Eckgtein, briefly considered closing
numbers of its poorer mines in 1897. Despite the failure to secure
;
 major reforms from Kruger's government in 1897, profits of the
? operating companies wars maintained up to the war largely through
*— ~
v
 black wage reductions in lets 1896 and early 1897 and the first (par-
j tially) effective efforts to organize monop30nistic recruiting.
25
Though herdevidancB is lacking, it appears tha£~~the
minaa wara also working tha richer ores end leaving es much at the
lou grade ore in tha minaa es possible. It uas not then a requirement,
ao it la today, that a company work to the average greds of the ore
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in tha mina.
Tha disruption causad by the war, tha deterioration of plant and
equipment and tha loss of intarast upon inueated capital owing to tha
suspension cf oparations exacarbetsd cost problems for tha mines. In
the iramadiata postwar years, the neBd to sacura substantial cost re-
ductions appearad as a rnora urgent necasaity even than it had been in
271897. Both van dar Harat and Dsnoon have suggested that the labour
shortage of 1902-1903 was to some extent artifically manufactured by
the mine ownars. In their grsad, according to this analysis, the Rand-
lords severely depressed black wages and wildly exaggerated the posai-
bilities of expansion and hence of the future demand for labour. It
may ba, on the other hand, that these decisions on wage levels and
expansion possibilities owed less to simple graad and more to low grade ore
than the van dar Horst/Denoon interpretation would admit. In the after-
math of uari tha mining haussa confronted the consequences of their
own earlier optimism. On tha basis of pre-war investment decisions,
thBy wara already committed to low grade mining and thu3 to the cost
constraints which this involved* However, it must ba admitted that tha
black wags rate of thirty shillings (average per month of thirty shifts)
eotablishsd just after tha war was absurdly low and counter-productive
es the industry itsalf recognized when, at tha end of 1902;it re-
turned to tha (still low) fifty shilling averaga established in 1897. 29
An examination of the early history of the industry reveals a
growing preoccupation with the problems of low grada mining* In this
is to ba found e partial explanation for the persistent efforts of
the owners to involve governments in attamts to keep coats as low as
possible. Through government action they hoped to secure greater
leverage upon costs and control over the economic uncertainties to
which thay ware vulnerable. For this support a substantial price was
exacted in terms of higher tBxea and closer government control, but it
was ona which the owners were quite willing to pay. Dr. van der Horat
recognized the early commitment of tha state to the support of the
low grade mines, "for successive governments have feared the con-
30
sequences of any contraction of the mining industry". She dated
-fcha—gmBJ.gB.n.c.g__of__thi_a policy from the appointment of the Low Grade
Plinas Commission in 1916. In fact, however, even Kruger*s government
was being pressed to assist the poorer mines, and the Crown Colony
edministretian was clearly committed in the same direction. Govern-
ment support was nowhera more important than in the organisation of
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the supply of migrant labour, and tha balance sf ths paper is concerned
with a discussion of the evolution of policy in this area.
As early as 1890, tha Chambar of Mines was writing candidly to
tha govsrnmant: "Private enterprise has repeatedly failed in attempting
to organize end maintain an adequate supply of Kaffirs. Ths task must
ba undertaken by thB public authorities, and the Chamber trusts that
the Government will land it their indispensable assistance". ~ Spe-
cifically, tha industry requested a more vigorous enforcemant of ths
pass law, measures to atop the "molestation" of Africans en route to
ths mines and the creation of depots along tha main routes to shelter
migrant workers. As wall the Chamber wanted direct "encouragement" of
32
mine labour by government officials in the rural areas. Failure of
the government to act effectively in these matters led the industry to
establish a Native Labour Department of the Chamber of nines in an
effort to coordinate policy and to reduce competition for labour among
34
tha groups. A Native Labour Commissioner, William Grant, was also
appointed to head up ths department. Inadequately staffed, starved of
resources and without the means of enforcing a common policy on the
industry, this department was little more successful in handling the
preblam than ths Chamber itself had been befors 1B93.
In 1895 after several yaars of agitation, the Chamber of P!ine3
induced thB Uolkaraad to enact a special pass law applicable in "labour
districts" (defined under the act to coincide with mining districts).
The act had bean drawn up for the industry by the Native Labour Com-
mittee of the Chamber, and it was baasd partly on Natal models. Tha
new pass law provided for a rudimentary form of influx control; end
it enjoined Africans to wear e metal arm badge (amanded later to e
requirement that en official pass be carried) numbered as a msans of
identification. Penalties wars prescribed for breachsa of the act,
35
particularly for desertion. Supplementing the new pas3 leu was the
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general pass law of the republic. PlorBover, tha Plaster and Servants
Act (a legacy of the first British administration of the Transvaal)
provided criminal penalties for breach of labour contracts*
One feature of this legislation which has escaped attention is
that it UQB designed partly to protect the mines from each other.
-Du-rl-nq—the—1-8.9Ql.a_thB_cheapest and naaieat recruitinq took plncu on
tha Rand Itself. It was the regular practice of many mine managers
to "recruit" labour from each other. Labour "touts" and African "run-
ners" in the pay of one mine management would procure desertions
from tha compounds of neighbouring minQs through promises (usually
37
false) of batter pay or conditions. Some of thase "touts" war a free-
lancsra, paid by tha head; others seam to have baen salaried employee3
of tha various minea. So long as there ues no ready msans of identifying
dasertars, it provad impossible to control thia activity. The nau pass
law U B S designed specifically to eliminate "thefts" of labour from one
mina by another* It is thus no accidant that tha iaiplamantation of
the nsu paaa law in 1896 coincided with the wags reduction agreements
of lata 1396 and early 1897.(cutting black wages by thirty per cent
and providing for a system of inspection of company wage sheeta to
38
entorco compliance)• The formation of the Rand Native Labour
Association in late 1896 in on effort to monopsonizs recruiting uas
an essentially complementary step, dependent for ita effectiveness on
39
both the pass law and tha mage raduction agreements. Faulty admin-
istration of the peas law seriously diminished its effectiveness, and
the "theft" of labour remained a problem (though now on a reduced
scale) up to tha outbreak of war.
After the war the Milner administration provided e much more
elaborate system of control* Tha pass department uas reorganised and
expanded; inspectors were appointed; and a "fingar impression" branch
41
•JS3 established to facilitate positive identification of deserters.
The new Labour Aganta Regulations (Proclamation 38 of 1901) pro-
42
nibit3d recruiting in labour districts. In spite of the expanded
system, the mines were still complaining of a high rate of desertions
43
and labour "theft" as lata as 1905-6. This is not to suggest that
desartion3 were solely a problem caused by cut-throat competition
betuasn rival mine managers. Horrific conditions in the compounds
and underground gave Africans ample reason to desart without being
incited to it by avaricious labour touts and hard-pressed mine managers,
However, there la overwhelming evidence that before tha war and even
to a dagree after, desertion in substantial part was a problem
created by the minea themselves.
At tha request of the Chamber the republic also acted against
the illicit liquor dealers who 3uermed on the Rand, and in 1897 it
finally legislated total prohibition of sale to Africans. The mining
lau of the republic, furthermore, uaa notoriously favourable to the
big interests. Though much of this legislation ua3 badly administered,
TE~~cTo a a^rev eal—vexy—we H—t-h e—e-x-ta ot~to- _u hie Jx-K-gug a.r_!_s_5_o vernmgnt,
despite its post-Raid suspicions of the industry, was drawn into a
close alliance with it. After the war, the Master and Servants Act,
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and tha Liquor lay wars takan ovor by the reconstruction government
with only changes in detail.
In pursuit of favourable legisletion, the industry was quickly
drawn into close relationship with government officials. Both as mem-
bera of official Chamber deputations and on an individual basis raining
leaders had easy access to the republican executive, including the
State President himself. 3.B. Robinson used his good knowledge of
Afrikaans and his initially friendly relations with Kruger to the dis-
45
tinct advantage of his various Randfontein enterprises. Soma com-
panies maintained en office in Pretorie. The Uarnher, Beit/Eckstein
group deputed one of tha partners to handle tha "Pretoria work", much
of which involved acting as a kind of lobbyist. A good deal of money
was apparently spent on these activities. There is clear evidence that
Christiaan Joubart, tha "Chief" of nines, was bribed on several
occasions. Money was spent on "improving" the Volksread and on attem-
46pting to influence bath the republican elections of 1893 and 1898.
On the latter occasion 3.B. Robinson in cooperation with Uarnher, Beit/
Eckstein channelled funds to tha support of Schalk Burger and P.3.
Ooubert egainst Kruger with Robinson himself playing the improbable
47
role of cl&ndastina campaign manager and beg man.
In tha rural areas, particularly of the northern Transvaal, B
number of the native commissioners wore accused of taking bribes from
48labour "touts" and mining compeniaa. In return thaaa men either
bribed or coerced African chiefB and headman to turn out levies for
49the mines. Some considerable auccaaa attended these activities,
and by 1B99, the northern Transvaal waa emerging as a significant
source of African labour for the mines. Moreover, it appears that
the burghers were being priced out of tha labour market* In 1896, the
Uolksraad enacted a measure providing for ths payment of chiefs in
return for agricultural labour. Those who provided over fifty
labourers in e year were to recaive five shillings par head. Lesser
bounties ware prescribed for smaller numbers.
Under the reconstruction administration a much closer uorkincj
alliance developed between mining leadera and the government. At
leBt the mine owners hod, as they thought, a regime committed to the
mexfmum expHyftati~o n~~oT—the—Rand—and—equipped -to—be—both—hone.8-t_and__
efficient. Immediate snd far-reaching reforms were expected even hy
thoae magnates who had been closest to Kruger's government. 51 rho
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Ch.nbar of Mines lost no tima in making its uant> known. As aarly
a a 1900, . raquast came forward from the Chamber suggesting that th.
govarnaant take over responsibility for mine labour recruiting. This
raqua.t was rsfuaad, on. indication that flilnar had no m e n t i o n of
Barving the indu3try at tha expense of his broader socio-political
objactiuaa. In fact the Crown Colony government aluay.a had to balance ^
the demands of the mines with the other claims upon it. The priority /e. a -
given to rural davelopmant, for example, led froquantly to conflict
with industrial policy. Sines the chergs of capitalist domination was
already currant, both in England and in South Africa, miner had strong
political reasons to avoid identifying the governmant too closely yith
• .4 4. • S 3
the mining industry.
••- Shortly after civilian rule was re-established in the Transvaal
^ in 1902, direct taxas on mining revanues were raised over what they
hed been before tha war. The republican profits tax (legislated in
1898) which had never been collected uas implemented end raised from
five to tan par cent. The extension of the municipal boundaries of
Johannaaburg randarad residential property of many mines liable to
local rates. 5* There w 3 9 some compensation in a considerable reduction
in the price of dynamita. What lUlnat told Fitzpatrick, The President
of tha Chamber in 1902, was that the mines would havs to look for their
savings not to the area of direct taxation but rather in improved
administration.
In tha first year or so of the new government, several of the
) magnates wera themselves involved in various official administrative
Jobs. Dr. Hauby haa noted the heavy commitments in this respect carried
by members of the Usrnher, Beit/Eckstein group. At the lower end
of the bureaucratic echelon there was also a tendency to employ men
with mining company experience. This was particularly the case of ;
the inspectorate established in the Native Affaire Department to !
police conditions on tha mines, to check violation., of the pass law ;
end to act as tha "protectors" of Africans. At least in the early years
this amounted to setting tha wolf to guard the flock. That a flow of
personnel also took place from the government to the industry tended
to cement the alliance between them. When the Uitwatersrand Native
Labour Association was established in 1900 to replace the moribund
 ; '
RNLA, its first General Manager was Major C.fl. Goodwin who had been
on official in the Transvaal military govarnment. Goodwin was succeeded
by T.a.fl. McFarlana and T.P1.C. Noursa as joint general managers. Tha
- 12 -
*
latter was Officar-in-charga of Native Affairs bsfora the inauguration
of civilian tula, Early in 19Q2 Frederick Perry, who had earlier served
in tha Colonial Office, left hiB post aa Imperial Secretary to succeed
Harold Stranga as Chairman of WNLA* These men had moved easily in high
govsrnmant circles end now their contacts were brought to the service
of the mining industry. Indeed, the line dividing industry from govern-
ment tended at timea to blur* Certainly Perry tended to act et tha head
of UfJLA as if he uas running a government department rather than a pri-
vate corporation. On occasion the Commissioner of Native Affairs,
Godfrey Lagden, who was himself notably sympathetic to the needs of
the mines, felt obliged to criticize Perry'for this.
Using the correspondence files of the Native Affairs Department
") it would be easy to make a case that Lagden end his officials answered
rather to the Chamber and UINLA than to their superiors in government.
An extensive and partially privets correspondence was exchanged on a
regular basis* Tha monthly reports of the executive of the Chamber
usre sent to Leaden aa a matter of course* So alao were the bi-monthly
57
reports of the UNLA ganaral managers to the board of management. The
latter somatimes contained highly confidential information uhich at
. least implied that UNLA was using recruiting methods et variance with
i
government policy, Lagdan and hia Secretary of Native Affairs, U),
Uindham met frequently with leading officials of both the Chamber and
the recruiting association* Thesa men uere treeted with extreme de-
ference* Whenever Lagden had occasion to criticize some industry de-
ficiency, his prefered method uas to write a private note to the
<* senior official of tha company concerned or to speak informally to tha
President of the Chamber, As a result, many complaints did not even
coma officially to tha attention of tha government. Mining leaders far
their part frequently briefed Lagdan and sought his approval in advance
of major and even minor policy changes. The effect of these informal
B
exchanges was to reduce the inapendenca of the Native Affairs De-
partment, and doubtless this uas the intent of the industry in pro-
moting them. Having been consulted privately by tha Chamber during
the planning of policy, Lagdan uas handicapped in bringing forward
official criticism at a later stage.
-T4vis—clxj«e_Ee.l*tionahlp_b.e.t«e_en_ttie_mine8__eild_JJeJtiJ^ e Affaira
department officials developed at every leval of the administrating
hierarchy. The department inspectors were rarely critical of their
opposite numbers, the compound managers. A departmental report on the
53
sncs of the lattar was notably generous in its assessments.
Ths statistics of the department gave unwitting evidence of just hou
tha3a men conceived thair role. During 1902 and early 1903, tha in-
spectors, uho wars supposed to act in aoma sen3Q as the "protectors"
of Africans on the nines, investigated thirteen casea of alleged assault
upcn black rnina workers by thair white overseers and twanty-Bight
complaints concarning alleged wage irregularities. In the same period
well over 3000 Africans were disciplined for breach of contract and
for other "offences" against their employers. These figures were su-
fficiently startling to provoke a question in the House of Commons
59
and a subsequent inquiry by the Secretary of State. Scattered through
tha files of the department are several references to work stoppages
caused by short-lived strikes of black mine workers* On such occasions,
tha mine management would invariably contact the nearest inspector.
In aach case tha inspector ordered tha Africans beck to work,
threatening those who refused with immediate arrest for breach of con-
tract » Every effort was made to identify the leaders of the strikes
end to bring them to trial. Far from being in any meaningful sense
the "protectors11 of Africansf ths inspectors acted primarily in the
interest of the owners to enforce a harsh industriel discipline.
Hauever, thara Is another dimension to the relations betueen tha
Native Affairs Department and the mining industry. In one area the
departmant did act with considerable vigour and effectiveness to im-
prove the conditions of the black labour force. This was on the matter
of mining compounds. Without exception, all of those who were connected
with these matters testified to the grotesque situation uhich prevailed
before the war. Throughout southern Africa there was a regular traffic
in black labour for the mines. Once en route to the Rand, an African
would typically pass through the hands of two or three labour "touts"
(in effect having baen sold from one to tha next) before he reached
hia destination* Those who arrived safely at the mines after running
a gauntlet of avaricious labour agents, government officials, predatory
farmers and actual thieves, met a new set of horrors. Among those who
testified before the Transvaal Labour Commission in 1903 were several
men with diroct axparience of compound conditions as they wore before •
and Just after the war. A former compound manager at the Crown
-mine—apoke-of^tha—HdLrink^aoddon condition, want of discipline and
general morel decay" of the Africans on tha mine. **' The Reverend E.
Croux described "tha fearful corruption and contamination" and the
constant illness in tha compounds which ha had been allowed to visit. 62
Parhaps tho moat graphic description was givan aomsyhat later in a
private letter to Lagdan:
No manf-_with any claim to manhood, could have gone thru
tho3a /PrewaJs7 experiences end not have realized the in-
describable horror of it* To aay that at ugakand I car-
ried my lifa in my hands is putting it mildly; it was
a constant case of having to quell riota among natives
frenzied with drink, and I fear that in the process I
had over and ovar again to adopt methods which ...
would ordinarily hava qualified me for gaol* I have
nevar used a revolver tho I always carried one, but I
have been thru riota with a heavy sjambok and with that
quailed the disturbances but almost at the cost of some .
natives lives. The horror of it I shall never forgat...,
Mortality statistics ara not available for this period, but the death
A rate ua3 probably betasen aighty and ona hundred per thousand psr
annum. On soma mines and during the winter months It waa almost cer-
tainly very much higher than that,
Vary quickly after the return to civilian rule in the Transvaal,
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tha Natiua Affairs Dgpartmsnt begen to press for reform. Compound
managers wars brought under a degrea of control and like the labour
aganta required to hold government licancea. NatiVB Affairs Departmant
inspectors began to report on compound conditions and to gather mor-
tality statistics* Tha raports and the statistics revealed a shocking
situation, little, If at all improved since the war. Armed with
incontrovertible evidence of endemic disease and high mortality on
the minao — included in the UNLA reports under the heeding of
J "wastage" — Lagdan approached tha Chamber to insist upon reform.
Lagden's paternalism was outraged by tha situation ravaalad in tha
Inspectors* reports* To effect a transformation became something of an
obsession with him. The intention of publishing mortality statistics
gave him a levar with which to act on senior mining company officials.
Before long substantial improvements began to taka place in tha com-
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pounds* Moreover, tha Chamber of flings itself began to underwrite
inquiries and research into the causes of disease amongst the black
68 •
labour force* Even hare, however* in an area whare Lagdan himsalf
aaema to have bean personally engaged, tha department treated tha minea
with great leniency, Thsy ware given considerable time to carry out
tho—impr-ovameftta ,--Tha-y_w.B.r.a_assurad that there would be no premstura
publicity. Low grade mince or mines nearing tha end of thair productive
life were not requirad to affect Improveme nts involving the expen-
diture of large capital sums.
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That Lagden was able to convince the industry to initiate reform
had partly to do with a fear of censure from the home government.
Another consideration was the mounting evidence thet compound conditions
were seriously interfering with recruiting. WNLA agents, Transvaal
native commissioners end officials of the Cape and Baautoland pointed
70
this out repeatedly. Lagdon also used their evidence in his efforts
to secure reform. Yet the leaders of the industry were slow, extra-
ordinarily slow to take the point thet their own self interest would
71be served by a reduction in mining mortality. Lagden had to resort
to threats in order to force improvements. For years he fought with
Max Langerman to get the Robinson group to provide decent conditions
In its compounds. On one occasion Lengermen was virtually ordered to
accompany Lagden an a tour of the Robinson compounds. Even this did not
\^ work, and it uas only when Lagden threatened to withdraw the passes
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from the group's labour force thet it began to act* This type of
experience finally led the Transvaal authorities to enoct a Coloured
Labourers1 Health Ordinance in 1905 which prescribed minimum compound
conditions end gave tha Native Affairs Department power to enforce
compliance.
Even thio minimal degree of friction tended to ba en exception
in the generally cordiel relations between the Transvoal authorities
and the mine owners* The government gave indispensable assistance to
WNLA in its efforts to widen the catchment area of its recruiting
operations. The negotiation of the Modus Vivendi with Portuguese
- Mozambique upon terms markedly favourable to that government reflected
* the priority which was given to increasing the labour supply. The flodus
Vivendi was accompanied by a aacret agreement (negotiated with the know-
ledge and consent of tha Transvaal government) between UNLA and the
Mozambique authorities. The effect of this arrangement was to give WNLA
a near monopoly of recruiting in the territory. Non-WNLA agents were
simply refused licences. The Crown Colony administration was also in-
strumental in securing the approval of London for the experimental
recruiting schema in the British Central African Protectorate (Uyaseland).
Lagden also made certain, of course, that his own native com-
missioners were wall aware that one of their important functions was
to—^ancour-oQe-^—mine—l^bourL_ln_t.ha-iT_d.ia.tr_ic±a-_ Just how far these
native commissioners were to go in promoting tha objects of LJNLA* uas
a delicate matter. Early in the reconstruction period, Chamberlain had
warned and miner had agreed that there must be no suspicion of forced
75labour eo undsr the republic. Though the Native Affairs Department
ua3 bound by this instruction, thsra is quite a bit of evidsnca that
tha ling batasan forca and persuasion tendad to be a fine one. On one
occasion, the native commissioner of the northern diviaion wrote in
alarm to Lagden that a recent court case had turned up "matter sug-
gestive of forced labour" for the mines. A riot had broken out during
recruiting operations in tha area. The native comraissionar explained
for tho racord thet "tha matter resolves itsalf into tha carrying out
only of the intricate internal menagamant of e somewhat powerful native
tribe". A facility with euphimiam was evidently a recommendation for
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thosa working in the Native Affairs Department at that time. Lagden
was tolerant of such incidents so long ae they did not draw unfavourable
publicity. Indeed tha emphasis he gava to the promotion of mine labour
almost certainly encouraged his officials to employ methods uhich
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x could not ba officially condoned* Certainly ha was aware of the
methods being employed by UNLA. Toward tha end of the Crown Colony
period, ha wrote to Salborna that UNLA regularly provided "presents
and bribas" to Portuguaae officials and to native chiefs and headmen;
"No doubt, it has bean necessary for private /Tabour/ associations to
hove large amounts of 3ecrat sarvlce money ot their disposal to be ex-
pendsd without question or doubt** -~ "not corruptlyMf ha added in the
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margin, "but sa a pure matter of business11. He asked that this
memorandum not ba passed on to the Botha government es It might be
"miaundorstood".
The central rola of the state in sustaining tha labour policies
of the mining industry was clearly revealed in tha labour crisis of
) ' 1906, which waa the product, partly, of the threatened withdrawal of
official support of the UNLA monopsony. A most vexing question for
;
 the mines and tha government during theaa years was the maintenance
of a regular and dependable flow of labour to the Rand* The Randlorda
themaalves demonstrated a singular incapacity both to anticipate their
own labour requirements for any distance into the future end to predict
tha supply situation. Tha problem waa9 however, complex* In any given
month, several thousand migrants would arrive at the UNLA central depot
In Braemfontain* These ware the Africans recruited by UNLA agents from
a catchment area which embraced a large port of the subcontinent, A
aignlficant number again would offer themselves at particular mines*
having mads thair own way to tha Rand •« volunteers* In thet same month
there would ba an outflow ~of several"ttibusalTd~ATricans—whose-eont-r-acta-.
had axpired, who were rspatriated (or simply kicked out of the com-
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pounds) because of illnssa, who had daserted or died. One difficulty
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 M.. to balance the Inflo- with the outflow. An incraaaa in recruit-
ment lavSl3 in one month would inavitably produca an accelerated out-
flou six to twelve months later ea fcha contracts of these workers ex-
pired. Any sudden change in recruiting levals — either up or down —
was likGly to catch the industry unauares. A sudden increase in the
supply during the firat months of 1905, for axa^ple, reaulted in the
minaa actually turning away labour. Since the Randlorda had baen shouting
only two years before about the labour shortaga, this was a cause of
some embaraasement to them, as wall as to tha government. An equally ^
sharp downturn in tha aupply later that same year (like the earlier J ;,
 r
increase, unaxplained end apparently unexpla^eble) produced a re- '
action akin to panic in the Chamber and in UNLA.
UNLA, of course, raprasented an effort to control demand, to ore-
0 vent wage competition and to allocate tha available labour on the
baaia of tha crushing capacity of member companies (as established by
a standing committee of mining engineers). In periods of sufficient
supply the systam worked fairly noil. In periods of falling recruit-
ment levels, trouble invariably followed. Under prassura to maintain
production targets, mina m a n o r s would start to cheet.They would en-
gaga in clandestine recruiting, they would offer "under the table"
bonusas or they would attempt to aecure 3 higher rating from UNLA
by exaggerating their crushing capacity and thus claim a higher oro-
portion of the available supply. The evidence suggests that breaches
of ths monopsony were endemic both in the last yeara of Kruger's re-
public and at intervale during ths reconstruction period. 3. B.
•x Robinson, for example, though a member of UNLA until late 1906, was
believed to maintain hia o«n agents in the Cape «ho supplied him with
"volunteers" outside tha UNLA system. 8 0 Labour agents' regulations in
the Transvaal and tha other colonies imposed constraints upon the re-
cruiting methods of licsnced agents. Moreover, at Lagden'a inaistance,
UNLA had bound itself to the medical examination of its recruits. Though
only looaely enforced, these regulations seem to have materially in-
creased recruiting difficultiea. Clandestine recruiting uas, of course,
affected by none of theaa constreints. During perioda of adversity, the
temptation to cheat waa thu» enormous, but the advantage would persist
obviously only ao long as most of the UNLA members bound themselves to
its rules.
Shortfalls In tl.» aupply inevitably produced acrimony within the
msodbtlon OB to Just whet thuaa tulaa should bo. Una con^tloua
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issue at such tinBa was invariably ths factor of uage levels. In public
discussion, most industry spokesman held — as indaad many of them con-
tinue to hold to the target worker argument. Within ths industry,
howavsr, agreement on this point was far from completa. During 1902
when the Chamber end UINLA ware especially concarnsd about the supply
an acrimonious dispute erupted "on tha wage issue. When production was
resumed in the later stages of the war, the industry had implemantsd a
minimum rate of wagss which at thirty shillings (thirty shifts) was
substantially lower than the rate agreed in 1697. As the labour shortage
continued during 1902, ona group within the industry argued for a re-
turn to the 1697 rate, uhila others, cleaving to the target workar
argument, fought for the maintenance of the thirty shilling minimum.
Despite efforts to present at least the appearancB of a united front
on tha occasion of the visit of the Secretary of State (early in 1903),
) Ths Chamber could do no more than rsgister tha two basic viewpoints on
t tha wags issue. 8 2 In the end ths proponents of tha increase had their
"~ " •• way. They wars able to secure acceptance of a complicated wage scale
y
 basad on the 1897 agreement, prescribing a "maximum average"wage of
f-«fty shii linos per thirty shifts and allowing for limited incentives
. 83
through piece work rates.
Much' more sariou3 was the crisis of 1906 which bedly damaged and
nearly destroyed the monopsony. It was the coincidence of recruiting
difficulties and s threatened withdrawal of official support from
WNLA as a result of political changes in Britain which produced trou-
ble. The first few months of 1905 saw a sharp increase in African
A employment on the Rend, reaching a peak in April when 107, 756 black
workers wera employed on the mines. There followed an equally sharp
downturn, beginning in September and increasing in intensity for over
six months. The low point was reached in July, 1906 when only 90,420
Africans ware employed. Thereafter a gradual recovery took place, but
the April, 1905.1*88 not excaeded until February, 1907. In tha
event, increasing numbers of Chinese (imported undBr licences issued
before the Unionists left office in December 1905) compensated for the
fall off of African employment, and tha total non-white labour force
remained relatively constant. What alarmed the owners, however, was
tha almost simultansoua fall of the Unionists and the formation of s
Liberal government in Britain committad to ending Chlnaao labour. Thus
tha foreign supply uaa threatnnad nt the very tima wh»n the flfricin
labour fores was dsclining in numbers.
Tha racord of the Liberals in opposition, together with their
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early decisions to auapand tha implamentation of" tho Lyttalton Con-
stitution, ta move directly to responsible government and to suapand
tha isaua of labour importation licencas left little doubt concerning
85
their attitude toward tha Randlorda. While the leadara of tha Chamber
and UNLA viewed thaas Changs3 with undisguised alarm and apprehension,
a few of thair colleagues saw in them opportunities which thay wara not
as
slow to exploit, Ths shark who troubled the bar was O.B. Robinaon. Toryeara, 3.8.R. and hi3 associates had chaffed at the restrictions
on them by membership in UNLA and the Chamber. In thess organisations
thay constituted only one group among several and not by any means tha
most important. Moreover, Robinson saw himself as a victim of the Crown
Colony administration* Close to Kruger in the pre-war period, hB now
confrontad a regime which waa unsympathatic to his group and which re-
87
garded Robinson himself with positive distaste* Robinson had already
mads contact with HetVolk, the activities of which he was later to sub-
sidize, and Langerman uas returned as a Hat V/olk candidate in the first
election under the new constitution*
Within a few months of the formation of the Liberal government,
Robinson wrote a series of letters to thg new Secretary of State, Lcrd
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Elgin, in an effort to build a bridgs in that direction. He first
attacked UfJLA, alleging that It3 recruiting methods were inefficignt end
pointing out (correctly) that it enjoyad a da facto monopoly on recruiting
in Mozambique. UMLA inefficiency, he auggasted* waa no accident and re-
sulted from a plot to make a case for continued Chinaae labour importation,
._) Robinson went on to claim that the Trenavsal authorities were under the
control of the Chamber which drafted all official despatches on labour
and mining queationa. Lord Selborne like Milner befora him waa the mare
cipher of tho big interests, Robinson's fabled cunning ia nicely dis-
played in these dealings with Elgin. Tha charges which he made ware well
calculated to appeal to the new administration. Both Robinson's rivals
in the industry end the Selborne government were thrown onto ths defensive
where thay remained throughout 1906.
From his mansion in Perk Lone, Robinson moved to destroy UMLA, In
April, 1906, the leaders of several of the raining houass wsre startled
to receive a blackmailing letter from A.C, Wilson, the menayar of a
new and mysterious organisBtion-CBl-lr<rti—the-~Tr<o»va^ il-JflXn&-»_t_ab_our Lom-
pany. Ha blandly Informed thg industry that his company had been ©o-
tabliahed to recruit in Plczarabiquo and that it had the approval of doth
tho Portuguese and the Transvaal authorities* The company waa negotiating
- 2 a -
far confirmation with Lisbon but uas encountering delays which it
attributed to UINLA opposition. A report on the situation had bean pre-
pared Tor the British cabinet and would reach London within the usak;
",,,ua have na hesitation in stating that our presentation of tha
matter, coupled with the sworn tsatimony we have obtained and aent
homa uiil result in free recruiting taking place in Portuguese Eaat
Africa". Uilson sadly conjured up tha avils which would follow tha re—
introduction of free recruiting, and he reviewed the horrors of tha pre-
war situation. The mines could prevent this by agreeing to limited com-
petition between the TMLC and WNLA. The reault, -he confidently predicted,
would be a doubling of the labour supply to the advantage of all con-
cerned. Wilson concluded his letter by stating that if UINLA ceased its
opposition forthwith, the TMLC would arrange to have ita report to the
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Liberal government "returned to us unopened"* The mining houses re-
' spondad warily at first and attempted to discover mho was behind tha
TNLC and what degree of official support it actually had* In the
end, they decided to call Wilson's bluff and to rBfuse to yield to black-
mail. The TP1LC did not have permission to recruit in Mozambique, but it
did hova an entry with London through Robinson whose agents wera behind
the formation of the compeny. What it also hod was a "certificate of no
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objection" from tha Transvaal authorities* Under the Modus V/ivandi,
the Transvaal had the right to vsto applications of labour agenta
seeking permission to recruit in East Africa* Salborna's officials
apparently did not realize tha implications of what they had dona. They
were aoon brought to their senses, however, and in 3una Selborne cabled
London that his government could have nothing to do with any such
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~) "scoundral" as "Kaffir" Wilson, The recently respectable manager of
the TMLC had auddenly become the Infamous "Kaffir" Uilson,
In a carefully coordinated campaign, Salborns, his officials and
the Chamber of PlinBs moved to head off Robinson. They warned the Imperial
authoritiea of the evila which would follow the introduction of com-
,y [ patitive recruiting. All of the controls which the government had
laboriously built up to protect African mine workers would be Jeopardised.
Moreover, tha wage agreement In the industry mould inevitably break down,
9'4
and the poorer companies would be priced out of the labour markut.
This Ia3t argument WBB certainly spurious. Tha WHO© nqrosmant \amn p m -
sentsd as a device which protected the low grade mines and collieries
from wage competition they couId not~affOT&-to—mea4-«—The—rlchaJ__companiea
which could afford higher wages (thereby securing their full complement
of labour — tha target worker argument was conveniently forgotten) had
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egreed to 3acrifica themselves in the interest of th9 low grade minaa.
Tha picture of ths industry as a disparate collection of rich and ponr
indpandant producers wo3f of coursa, erroneous, Tha controllers of the
rich mines ^ars also the ounara of mast of tha poor ones* In both ca-
pacities thay banafittad from tha wags agreement. Moreover, thia argu-
ment conveniently ignored thB fact that many of Robinson's holdings
were low grade propositions. According to what Selborna and the Chemher
wrote to Elgin, the Robinson group ought to have been tha last to lsave
In any case Robinson was at least one step ahead of them. Elgin
wrote to Selborne in May, 1906 that the government had received a de-
finite application from the Robinson group. In the viaw of tha Secratary
of Steta, it was "impossible to deny to so substantial an interest
the right to separata from /JSNLR? and to be placed on an equal footing
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with its competitors in obtaining labour". Elgin asked Selborne to
exert prassure on Lourenco Marques to secure recruiting licences for
Robinson, The High Commissioner uaa frankly informed that Elgin had
formed the view that tha Governor Ganarel of Mozambique "baliaves he is
acting in accordance with your wishes in giving the Association
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a practical monopoly". 3ust to make sure that Salborna understood
that he wa3 supposed to demonstrate tha impartiality of his government,
Elgin passed on Robinson's charges of Chamber domination of the Transvaal
administration.
Selborne did indged reply with a vigorous defence of the in-
dependence of his government* At the same time, however, ha adopted a
new strategy in dealing with Robinson which turned out to be also that
of the Chamber of Mines* This was to arguB for delay. The labour issues
ware complex, Selborne argued, end policy changes should be preceded by
a thorough inquiry — perhaps a Joint inquiry of the British and Par—
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tuQuese governments. This ploy also failed. Elgin replied that tha
Imperial government favoured a joint inquiry but only after Robinson
97had been granted his recruiting licences by the Portuguese.
Robinson meanwhile had ended his association with "Kaffir" Wilson and
the TMLC* In wlleon's place, n«G« Holmes, a Robinson group manegar, uas
appointed, and Holmes quickly established lilmsoIT at I otirenco fur-qua a.
In the face of Elgin's peremptory instructions, tha Transvaal govern-
ment had little choice but to grant~Hc^lne^~hTs~CBTtifit:Bta-of—no^ob
Jection. 99 After some delay, the Mozambique authorltiea al3o capitulated
and iaoued a licenca to Holmes*
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The response of tha nambers of WNLA was irnmediatB and dramatic —
sauva qui paut. The rhetoric which just weeks befora had bean used to.
dafend the monopsony — UNIA as tha guardian of tha Africans, UNLA BS
protector of ths poor mines — uas forgotten as tha other mining houaas
rushed to secura for themsalvaa what the Liberals had apparently acquired
for Robinson. Tha other major group3 all wrote to tha High Commissioner
demanding that London secure tha same privileges for their companies.
Gtherwise, as the Rend Ninea Limitad letter expressed it, the minsa of
their group would be "deprived of their just proportion" of Mozambique
labour. Tha President of tha Chamber reiterated the arguments which
mere always used when adverse government action uas threatened:
Tha position of many producers is today already sufficiently
eerio'j3. Lie are convinced that thair position uill become
\ precarious, and in many casea impossible, if ths cost of
production is further increased by reason of the increased
cost of native labour.
Selborne continued to do what he could to deflect Elgin and the Liberal
government from its course. Furthar efforts wars made to discredit
Robinson: "...the experience of the Native Affairs Oapartmant is that
the mines of the Robinson group will take no measures involving any
expense for ths welfare of their coloured labourers which cannot be
enforced by law." This waa true. On tha other hand, the contrasting
depiction of UNLA as a virtually humanitarian organisation was somewhat
103
overdrawn.
") 3.G. Baldwin, the British Consul General at Lourenco Karques,
raised another matter with Selborne which tha latter eagerly passed on
to the Secretary of State. Reporting a conversation with the Governor
General of Mozambique, Baldwin explained that the Portuguese authorities
were opposed to competitive recruiting which might disturb the colony.
The Govsrnor General himself favoured government recruiting for the
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mines, and Baldwin pointed out that this meant forced labour*
Government recruiting would also give Mozambique an even greater
stranglehold on the Transvaal* If the Transvaal was placed at tha
mercy of the Portuguese in this way, Selborne suggested, his government
might be forced to amend the ftodus Vlvandl and to grant further con-
cessions to Mozambique on railway and customs policy* This In tuir, wou;r?
exacerbate—bad—fee-linq-batween—the—T-r-ansvaal- and—thB_Gep.e_ai}d_Ji*iUi_U__
Roth tha Chamber and tha Transvaal government mads every effort
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to improas upon ths Sacratary of Stata tha disastrous conssquencas for
tha mioaa, for the Transvaal and for British South Africa which his
continued support of Robinson would involve. Nona of this should be
taken at face valua* There was more than an element of contrivance in
the indacent ha3te with which tha othar mining groups rushad to abandon
UNLA whan the Liberal decision to back Robinson became known. Moreover,
the letters which thay wrote, demanding 3imiler privilagas for them-
selves, wars virtually identical. Hera is evidence of an orchestrated
disunity — an organised campaign to create thB appearance of chaos in
tha hopa that tha Liberals would recoil from the consequences of their
support for Robinson and drop him.
Lord Elgin was disturbed neither by tha threat to destroy WNLA
) nor by Salborne'a various alarmist warnings. The British government con-106
tinued to press ths Portuguese on behalf of Robinson. The other
mining housas uara informed that similar treatment for thair interests
could not ba considered until after the proposed joint inquiry with the
Portuguesa had takan place: "The Secretary of State accordingly requests
hia Excellency /tha High Commissions^/ to warn the members of the !Jit-
watsrarand Nativa Labour A3sociaticn against taking precipitately any
107irrevocable step for tha breaking up of the association". Thus
wa3 tha Chamber naatly checkmated and its threats to produce anarchy in
the labour markat rendered harmless.
The transparently hostile attitude of the Secretary of State to-
gether with the inability of Selborne to exercise much leverage upon him,
•=* forced tha Chamber and UNLA back upon thair own resources. Late in 1906
Robinson was forced to leave the recruiting association, and he also re-
signed from the Chamber of Mines. There remained the Portuguese pawn.
With the grant of the licence to Holmes by the Portuguese authorities,
it was generally beliaved that tha way had baen cleared for the Robinson
group to commence recruiting in Mozambique. Hence the immediate efforts
of the other mining groups to desert WNLA. In fact, however, Holmes'
licence was useless without permission to employ sub-agents and African
"runners". This the Mozambique government resolutely refused to grant,
despite pressure from tha Imperial government. Robinson's reliance upon
Elgin turned out to be as misplaced as that of his rivals upon Selborne.
10S
Hia protests were loud but unavailing. Tha final decision lay with /
tha Portuguese authorities, and, for whatever reason, they decided to
stand by their old allies in UNLA. The decision may have bean dictated
by a desire to damonatratg that Mozambique held the whip hand on the
labour issua. Portuguese pride and a desire to assart independence in
the fees of British pressure may have playad a part. It is also possible
that soraa of that UNLA secret servica money, referad to by Lagdent found
its way into the appropriate hands.
Thare uaa no spaedy resolution to the crisis. Though Robinson was
excluded from Mozambique, hi3 agents wars competing vigorously for
labour elsewhere in southern Africa, He was apparently still hopeful
that through Imperial pressure he would ultimately succeed in breaking
WNLA's hold on Portuguese East Africa, Early in 1907 the new Transvaal
government took a hand in the matter. Botha made contact with Robinson
and his enemies in an effort to bring the two sides together. The Prime
Minister also informed Selborne for transmission to tha Secretary of
StatB that his government was convinced that recruiting in Mozambique
mist bs carried on "through a 3ingle organised body /anty the Ulitwaters-
rand Nativa Labour Association must be kept in existence for this pur-
109 Ha was also opposed to the joint British-Portuguese inquirypose
an tha labour issua end wished to negotiate directly with Mozambique.
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Elgin agreed to go along with this. The Hat V/olk government per-
ceived whara the Liberals did not that a serious disruption of the in-
dustry was threatened and that not only tha mines but also government
revenue could suffer in consaqusnce. They may also havo been concerned
about the plight of their ally Robinson. In August Selborne uas able to
report that Botha had succeeded in composing the differences within the
mining industry. Robinson would rejoin both tha Chamber (September, 1907)
and UNLA (January, 1908), Apparently Botha himself had dreftBd the terms
of the settlement. Selborne concluded hia despatch by stating that his
government "has arranged to keep a genaral control ovar the work of the
Uitwatarsrand Nativa Labour Association" in order to act aa arbitrator
in disputes between member companies.
- •>
Through Portuguese support and with the mediation of tha Botha
government, WNLA was able to maintain a precarious hold upon Mozambique,
but it was far lesa auccesaful within British South Africa. Dis-
satisfaction with UNLA efforts in these areas led to widespread evasions
of tha monopsony as recruiting levels declined in late 1905 and 1906.
UNLA began to loss control not only over the labour supply but also over
its own recruiters. Charles Goodyear, a UNLA manager at Mefeking, de-
fected to tha enemy and signed on with Rd6Ths6ru~8y~T906~lffost~o"f~tha—~—
groups end not merely Robinson were recruiting on their own account, fle-
twean January 1 and Uctober 30, 1906t UNLA managed to recruit scarcely
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mere than ten par cent of tha available supply in tha northern Trans-
vaal (2337 out of a total of 2260,1). In the circumstances the !
association had little choica but to release its members from the re-
cruiting agreement, first in the Capa and Sasutoland and then later in
the northern Transvaal. In November, Trederick Perry, still the Chair-
man of UNLA, approached Lagdan to express his concern. He was fearful
of a rsturn to the anarchy and destructive competition which had pra-
vailed bafore the war* Both \JNLA and the Chamber were anxious that the
113
Native Affairs Department should act to prevent this.
The incapacity of these organisations to control their own members
uoa furthar revealed in an interview Lagdan granted to several in-
dustry representatives also in November. They told a sorry tale of com-
petitive recruiting, of the theft of labour from one mina by another,
of bribery and corruption within the industry, and, worst of all, of
breaches of the wage agreement. And they frankly confessed that they
uara quite unable to control the situation. It was up to the government
to save the minas from themselves by increased supervision of the com-
pounds, by the use of police trap3 and by a further extension of the
Finger InprBaaion Branch to facilitata the apprehension of deserters.
Lagden replied with one of his lectures:
I pointed out that the government could never counteract
the dishonest end disloyal action of certain mineB who
betrayed the confidence they ought to have in each other
and stole each others1 labourers aa they did before the
war. They ware in fact urging us to check evils which
they themselves uare the authors of.
Not until 1912 with the formation of the Native Recruiting Corporation
UBS the industry able to begin to renew the monopsony within South
Africa itself. The Robinson group did not adhere to the NRC until 1919,
after 3BR had retired from active perticipation in the management.
Tha crisis of 1906 reveals with particular clarity the central
role of the state in sustaining tha migrant labour policies of tha
Chamber of Mines, The mining industry was brought into close asso-
ciation with government not because it was strong, united and able to
impose its will but because it was divided in its councils and (at
"fraquent~iTrtB-rval3-)—cri-ppled-by-deatruct-l-ve—competition. __For the Rand-
lordB, tha relationship was rather one of dependence than of domin-
ation. It is important tD distinguish, however, hatuieen the adminis-
tration/
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and tha formulation of policy. In policy formation at least the Pgnd
finanelars did demonstrate substantial unity of purpose. The particular
circumstances of the 189Q's led to an early emphasis upon loiu grade
mining. Through their press end through the reports of successive
official inquiries, the Randlord9 uiBra able to promote the notion
that tha welfare of tha industry as a whole waa to be measured by the
health of its weakest producers. There waa unanimity in the industry
on this point. Thus labour end other policies were formulated in re-
lation to the presumed needs of a minority of tha mineaf the poorest
among them. 8ecau9a labour was, therefore, cheap on rich as well as
low grade mines, it was waste fully and ine,f f iciently used. The mine
owners demonstrated both ignorance and callous disregard of their
black labour force (frequently at the expanse of their own self- in-
terest) . Through coercive labour legislation, governmants protectad
thgm from the more obvious of tha consaquencea and at the same time
gave only minimal protection to the African mine workers. After
visiting Johannesburg in 1903, Joseph Chamberlain commented that
"much skill and brains had been put into tha mining and engineering
aide of tha industry end that now a portion of the sama should be di-
rected to the human side....11 Partly aa a result of the support
of tha state, this waa a lesson which the Rand mining industry never
had to learn.
A*H. Jeeves
Dohannasburg
Fiarch, 1975.'
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